A new study published in the Journal of Academics Stand Against Poverty exposes the vast reach of cybercrime syndicates operating out of Myanmar, revealing how online scams, money laundering, and human trafficking have become deeply embedded in the country’s border regions and illegal gambling industry.
Authored by Thant Thura Zan of Kyoto University and Soe Thaw Tar Kyaw Min of Eberswalde University, the research paints a stark picture of how transnational crime networks have transformed Myanmar into a hub for digital fraud targeting victims worldwide.
The study zeroes in on the phenomenon known locally as Kyar Phyant—a Burmese transliteration of the Chinese word for “scam”—which has become synonymous with fraudulent online gambling, romance scams, phishing schemes, and job fraud. These scams, often disguised as legitimate digital casinos or job ads, are run by criminal syndicates and frequently rely on forced labor, including trafficked victims from across Southeast Asia.
Myanmar’s ongoing political instability since the 2021 military coup has allowed these operations to flourish. Armed groups and local militias offer protection to scam compounds in exchange for payments, creating near-lawless enclaves. These zones, often along the China-Myanmar and Thailand-Myanmar borders, have become nerve centers of criminal activity.
In Laukkai, in northern Shan State near the Chinese border, the Kokang Autonomous Region has evolved into a hotbed for both real and fake casinos. The most powerful players are known as the “Big Four” Kokang families—Bai, Ming, Wei, and Liao—who are linked closely with Myanmar’s military and have used their influence to facilitate scams and launder proceeds via real estate and cryptocurrency.
Meanwhile, according to the report, areas like Shwe Kokko and KK Park on the Thailand-Myanmar border serve as models of how corruption, militias, and foreign investment converge. Backed by the Karen Border Guard Force and Chinese business interests, these developments claim to be new cities but in effect function as massive hubs for online scams.
Workers are recruited—sometimes willingly, sometimes under false pretenses—and forced into scam operations, with reports of abuse, torture, and even murder, according to reports.
Digital platforms such as Facebook and Telegram play a central role. Scam ads are embedded in viral videos and movie-sharing groups, and romantic scams often unfold over weeks of emotional manipulation. Once victims are hooked—whether into gambling or fictitious love affairs—the financial exploitation begins. In some cases, scammers hack personal data and extort money by threatening to contact victims’ friends and families.
More than $75 billion in stolen assets
The scale is staggering. Between 2020 and 2024, Southeast Asian online scam networks reportedly stole more than $75 billion.
According to blockchain analysis and US-based anti-slavery groups, one Chinese company operating in KK Park alone siphoned over $100 million via Tether (USDT) cryptocurrency wallets. An estimated 100,000 people in Myanmar are believed to be working under coercion in scam operations, often trafficked and held against their will.
Efforts to clamp down have met limited success. China has deported over 51,000 of its nationals from Myanmar since 2023, some linked to scams; and launched investigations that led to the arrests of key figures from the Kokang elite. In late 2023, a rebel coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027, targeting scam syndicates and their military protectors. But displaced criminals quickly migrated to new regions like Tachilek, building new compounds to resume operations.
Zan and Kyaw Min’s study situates these developments within a broader web of enablers: poverty, weak regulation, technological advances, and corruption. In Myanmar’s fractured political landscape, where the ruling junta profits directly or indirectly from these crimes, legal enforcement is often nonexistent or complicit, indicates the report.
At the international level, the researchers urge coordinated pressure. They call for targeted sanctions, international legal action under treaties such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and stronger financial regulations to stem the flow of illicit funds. They also emphasize the need for public awareness campaigns, regional cybercrime cooperation, and corporate responsibility from tech and financial platforms.
Ultimately, the authors argue that without the downfall of Myanmar’s military regime, there is little hope of dismantling the syndicates it shelters. Until then, they warn, the shadows of Kyar Phyant will continue to stretch across borders— shielded by power, and paid for by victims around the world.
